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It is suggested that people’s perceptions that they are inevitably tied to the social 
systems within which they operate motivate them to justify these systems. Evidence is 
obtained across four experimental studies using a variety of different methods. All studies 
test the basic proposition that increasing inevitability – that is, making a system seem 
either more difficult to escape or more unlikely to change – increases motivated 
rationalization. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate this basic phenomenon, using a known 
measure of system justification. Studies 3 and 4, in addition to conceptually replicating 
this phenomenon via different paradigms, provide support for a motivational (as opposed 
to purely cognitive-inferential) account, and mediational and moderational evidence for 
my proposed mechanism, respectively. The implications of these results – for the 
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A stranger given a window of observation into Western society could easily come 
to the conclusion that equality is not endorsed nearly to the extent indicated by explicit 
measures (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). The ever persistent gender pay gap and 
consistently lower employment rates among ethnic minorities compared to Caucasians 
are only two of a plethora of inequalities that exist in today’s society. Even when 
controlling for factors that could account for such inequalities, such as education and time 
spent working, women still make less and ethnic minorities are still less likely to be 
employed by simple virtue of their gender and race. Tables 1 and 2 provide data from the 
2001 Canadian census illustrating these realities. 
Given that such stark inequalities do exist, why do people ignore, deny, or even 
actively defend them and the societal structures that maintain them? In other words, how 
is it that societies that explicitly endorse values of equality (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986) are able to stand such instances of discrimination? System justification theory 
(SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) proposes one answer to this question. SJT argues that people 
are motivated to perceive their social systems as just and legitimate. This motivation is 
commonly referred to as the system justification motive, in recognition of the twin 
realities that systems are quite frequently not fair, and that people thereby find themselves 
forced to buy into an illusion of fairness. Indeed, there is a burgeoning set of empirical 
evidence in support of this proposition. Past research has demonstrated that people will 
go to great lengths to legitimize the status quo and the socio-political institutions under 
which they operate (e.g., Jost, 2001; Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Kay, Jimenez, & 
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Jost, 2002; Major, 1994; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002; Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 
2007; for reviews, see Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004 or Kay, Jost, Mandisodza, Sherman, 
Petrocelli, & Johnson, 2007; cf. Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007). 
At the same time, however, it is evident that sometimes people do not justify the 
status quo. A perusal of any history textbook will confirm that, at least on occasion, 
oppressed minorities overthrow their governments, underpaid workers go on strike to 
press for more fair treatment, and generally that people’s actions are sometimes 
motivated by explicit perceptions of unfairness. It may be surprising to note, then, that 
very little empirical system justification research has set out to investigate the boundary 
conditions of such phenomena. That is, relatively little is known about the social 
psychological and socio-cultural conditions that facilitate and limit the activation of this 
motivation. This gap in the empirical literature may have contributed to the erroneous 
conclusion that system justification effects are presumed to be ubiquitous and impossible 
to avoid. 
I propose, therefore, that the general idea that people are motivated to justify the 
system would benefit from a clearer picture of when this motivation is most likely to 
arise; that is, an empirical refinement of system justification theory. To this end, in the 
present research I examine the possibility that people might be especially motivated to 
justify the systems under which they operate when they believe that these systems are 
inevitable – that is, when they believe that the system in question will continue 
indefinitely to exert its influence over them. To the extent people perceive their systems 
as inevitable, I reasoned, unfairness should be experienced as especially threatening, and, 
to defend against such threat, justification of these unfairnesses should ensue. In contrast, 
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when a system is perceived as evitable – perhaps because it is easily escapable or 
constantly changing – perceiving unfairness in the current version of the system should 
be less threatening to a given individual. Because of this, people who view their systems 
as evitable should be less motivated to justify them. 
Rationalization in social psychology 
The social psychological literature offers some support for the proposition that 
systems to which people feel inevitably tied will be the most likely to be justified. Other 
theories of rationalization as a general phenomenon have emphasized the importance of 
the inevitability of the rationalized outcome, such as the inability of the rationalizer to 
escape it or the probability of the outcome occurring. Many people have suggested and 
demonstrated that human beings are avid rationalizers – most notably, cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Although explanations for when rationalization will 
and will not occur have called on a number of different factors, the one factor that seems 
to be applicable to all types of rationalization is the inevitability of the outcome – that is, 
the inability of the rationalizer to escape it. In dissonance studies, people rationalize their 
past, not future, decisions. Presumably this occurs because their past decisions can no 
longer be changed, and are therefore inevitable, whereas their future decisions are still 
under their control and therefore not inevitable (see Knox & Inkster, 1968; Regan & 
Kilduff, 1988). Research on anticipatory rationalizations (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002, 
McGuire, 1960, Pyszczynski, 1982) – in which the likelihood of an event occurring is 
predictive of the extent to which it is viewed as desirable – further supports this idea. 
Delving into research in the area of interpersonal relations, an even closer parallel 
can be drawn to the predictions of the present research. Empirically supported models of 
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romantic relationships, including Rusbult’s (1980) investment model and Thibault and 
Kelley’s (1959) dependence model, suggest that the quality of available alternatives has a 
negative impact on commitment and interdependence in close relationships. Other 
researchers have illustrated the various consequences of commitment in romantic 
relationships, including benign appraisals of the partner’s transgressions (Menzies-Toman 
& Lydon, 2005), positive illusions about the relationship (Martz, Verette, Arriaga, Slovik, 
Cox & Rusbult, 1998; Murray & Holmes, 1997; Murray, Holmes, & Griffin, 1996) and 
positive illusions about the partner, especially when the individual is facing a relationship 
threat (Gagné & Lydon, 2001). 
The quality of available alternatives to one’s current romantic relationship, I 
submit, is a form of inevitability: to the extent that viable alternatives are low, the current 
relationship is more likely to seem like the only viable option, and thus to feel like it will 
remain a part of one’s life forever. From this perspective, the correspondence between the 
present theory and findings in the relationship literature is rather striking. The lower the 
quality of the alternatives that people perceive to their current relationships – in other 
words, the more their current relationships seem inevitable – the more committed they 
are, and therefore the more susceptible they become to positive illusions and biases about 
their relationship and their partner. Transferring this line of reasoning to the level of the 
system, I am predicting that as alternatives to the present system seem less feasible, 
people will be more motivated to justify the system, and therefore more subject to the 
biases induced by this motivation. 
Finally, Social Identity Theory (SIT) also offers predictions that are consistent 
with my hypothesis. For instance, Turner and Brown (1978) found that low-status group 
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members accepted their inferior status unless they perceived cognitive alternatives to the 
current intergroup hierarchy – i.e., unless they perceived their low status as both 
illegitimate and likely to change (Turner & Brown, 1978). In other words, members of 
low-status groups did not fight to improve their status when they perceived that the 
intergroup hierarchy was inevitable.  
It is important to note, however, that despite the overlap between the predictions 
offered here and previous theoretical approaches, the specific mechanism I propose to 
underlie system justification effects, and the range and types of empirical demonstrations 
I provide in the thesis, have never been previously offered.  The General Discussion will 
expound in greater depth upon the empirical and theoretical similarities and differences 
between past research (in the context of SIT and elsewhere) and the data and theory I 
offer here.  
Predictions and Overview of studies 
I predict, therefore, that when people believe that their current system is unlikely 
to be a lasting influence over their lives – that it is escapable or likely to change – they 
should be protected against the biases of the system justification motive. In contrast, 
when people believe that there is no alternative to their current system, that its current 
form of influence is likely to persist for an indefinite period, they should be much more 
vulnerable to these biases. To this end, in each of the studies presented, I manipulate 
inevitability and assess system justification, predicting each time that increased 
inevitability should be associated with increased justification. 
Thus, the basic hypothesis tested in all the studies reported here is as follows: 
increasing a system’s inevitability will enhance the motivation to justify the system. I used 
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a triangulating approach to isolate these two conceptual elements by operationalizing 
them in different ways across this set of studies. This allowed me to test the breadth of 
the notion of inevitability, shed light on the mechanism driving these effects, and do so 




FOUR STUDIES EXAMINING INEVITABILITY AND THE RATIONALIZATION 
OF SOCIAL INEQUALITY 
Study 1: System change and helping the disadvantaged 
My first study provided the simplest test of the general hypothesis, that increasing 
a system’s inevitability – that is, increasing the extent to which people feel they will be 
inevitably tied to a particular system – will enhance the motivation to justify that system. 
However, for the purposes of Study 1, I found it more intuitive to phrase it in the opposite 
direction: decreasing a system’s inevitability – that is, decreasing the extent to which 
people feel they will be inevitably tied to a particular system – will reduce the motivation 
to justify the system. I manipulated inevitability in this study by changing participants’ 
perceptions of the likelihood of system change. I predicted that people would be less 
likely to justify their system when system change was forecast (i.e., when inevitability 
was low), and more likely to justify their system when the forecast was no change (i.e., 
when inevitability is high). In addition, I manipulated not only the presence of change, 
but also its direction. The presence of any kind of change should serve as a signal that the 
system might not persist in its current form into the future (i.e., that it is not inevitable) 
which should reduce the threat associated with the perception of injustice perpetuated by 
the system’s current instantiation. Therefore, I expect there to be no effect of the direction 
of change; the mere presence of change, regardless of direction, should lead to reduced 
system justification. 
Following these manipulations, I assessed system justification by measuring 
participants’ willingness to support redistributive social policies such as welfare 
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assistance and affirmative action (Wakslak et al., 2007). Support for these kinds of 
policies can be assumed to reflect the motivation to justify the system for two reasons. 
First, system justification involves increased support for the status quo in general; 
therefore, to the extent that such programs are framed as new initiatives, the motivation to 
justify the system should be associated with decreased support for them. Second, the 
nature of social redistributive programs is such that, by definition, they aim to redress 
inequalities that exist in society. Therefore, supporting these programs requires an 
admission that such inequalities exist and that they need to be rectified. When individuals 
are motivated to justify the system, either because of their personal tendencies or because 
of situational factors, they are less likely to want to make such an admission, and 
therefore less likely to support redistributive social policies. 
I predicted, therefore, that compared to conditions of decreased inevitability, 
conditions of increased inevitability would lead to increased system justification, as 
expressed in this case by less support for social redistributive programs. In other words, 
the specific form for the general hypothesis for Study 1 was that increasing the likelihood 
of a system changing, regardless of the direction, would lead people to demonstrate less 
justification of the current status quo. In more concrete terms, this hypothesis was tested 
using a 2 (change vs. no change) by 2 (high equality end result vs. low equality end 
result) design, where support for social redistribute programs served as the dependent 
measure. I expected that change would lead to increased support for these programs, but 






Participants. Forty-three Canadian citizens (23 women and 20 men) were 
recruited from a public venue on campus. All participants completed the survey booklet 
on site and received a chocolate bar for participating. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered themselves for a study on “Trends of 
Society.” The experimenter, who was blind to condition, handed them a booklet 
containing instructions and study materials, and sent them to a quiet area to complete 
materials on their own. First, participants were asked to read an article about Canada’s 
current and projected numbers of female business executives. Participants in all 
conditions read the predictions of a prestigious-sounding research group with regards to 
the proportion of women among top company executives. These predictions served as the 
manipulations of inevitability and of direction of change. Participants in the high 
inevitability conditions read that the number of female business executives would remain 
stable over the next 3 years; whereas participants in the low inevitability conditions read 
that the number of female business executives would change over the same time period. 
Furthermore the final outcome was manipulated so that it appeared that women would be 
either almost equitably (high equality end result) or only minimally (low equality end 
result) represented as business executives (whether or not this outcome was the result of a 
change). 
Specifically, participants in the high inevitability conditions read the following 
passage. Where the conditions differed in terms of the equality of the end result, text for 
the high equality end result condition is in brackets.  
   
A recent report released by the CIBC World Markets predicts that in 2010, women will 
make up 10.2% [32.2%] of the top company executives in this country. Some may find it 
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surprising to learn that this number represents a change of only 0.3 percentage points 
from data reported in the 2001 Canadian census – in other words, over the course of nine 
years, there will not have been much change in the number of women represented among 
top Canadian business executives. The charts below represent this state of affairs. 
 
Participants in the low inevitability conditions read the following passage (where 
the conditions differed in terms of the equality of the end result, text for the high equality 
end result condition is in brackets): 
A recent report released by the CIBC World Markets predicts that in 2010, women will 
make up 2.9% [32.1%] of the top company executives in this country. Some may find it 
surprising to learn that this number represents a whopping decrease of 7 percentage points 
[increase of 22.2 percentage points] from data reported in the 2001 Canadian census – in 
other words, over the course of nine years, there will have been a decrease leading to 
there being approximately one third [an increase leading to there being approximately 
three times] the number of women represented among top Canadian business executives. 
The charts below represent this state of affairs. 
 
In all conditions, this paragraph was accompanied by a pie chart providing a 
visual depiction of this change or stability in female representation among top business 
executives. Once again, these were provided to emphasize differences between conditions 
in terms of the presence of change and the direction of its end result. 
Next, participants were then presented with a measure of system justification 
developed by Wakslak et al. (2007) that assesses the extent to which participants 
supported the existence of six community service programs targeted towards various 
disadvantaged groups. Importantly, these programs were in no way related to the role of 
women in business, and did not target women specifically. The present hypothesis 
predicts that the content of the change is, in the same way as its direction, irrelevant. 
Change in any domain of a system should lead to the thought that change, in the abstract, 
is possible within it, and therefore to reduced justification in all domains of that system. 
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The programs described in the measure of system justification, then, were a 
tutoring program targeting children from disadvantaged backgrounds, a soup kitchen 
targeting the hungry, a job training program for the unemployed, a mentorship program 
for young people from disadvantaged backgrounds, a crisis hotline for people in distress, 
and an adopt-a-grandparent program for the elderly. Participants were asked to use, for 
each of these programs, a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
to rate their agreement with statements regarding their support for its creation, and the 
likelihood that they would vote for it to be funded by the government, volunteer for it, 
and donate money to it. Because participants’ responses to the questions about their 
support for community service programs were highly intercorrelated, yielding a 
Cronbach’s α of .91, an average score was created to serve as the dependent variable. 
Finally, participants were compensated, thanked and fully debriefed. 
Results 
Pilot testing. A separate sample of sixty-nine participants (31 women, 38 men) 
were asked to read the manipulations, and then use a 7-point scale to rate, without 
referring back to the manipulation text or figures, their agreement with two items 
designed to assess the effectiveness of the two manipulations. As predicted, participants 
exposed to the low inevitability manipulations were more likely to agree that “women’s 
place in Canadian businesses is changing” (M = 5.74, SD = 0.79) compared to 
participants exposed to the high inevitability manipulations (M = 2.88, SD = 1.63), F(1, 
65) = 86.1, p < .001. In addition, participants exposed to the many women manipulations 
were more likely to agree that “in 2010, women will play a role almost as large as men in 
Canadian businesses” (M = 4.69, SD = 1.23) compared to participants exposed to the few 
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women manipulations (M = 2.69, SD = 1.34), F(1, 65) = 65.3, p < .001. Including gender 
as a factor made no difference to either of these analyses; thus, both men and women 
were sensitive to the manipulations of change and of the equality of the end result. 
Primary analyses. Recall that the main prediction for this study was that that 
increasing the likelihood of a system changing would lead participants to be more 
supportive of social redistributive policies. In particular, I expected that the mere 
presence of change would reduce system justification (i.e., support for the current status 
quo), and that the direction of change should be irrelevant. A system changing in any 
particular way should, I thought, lead people to view the system as less permanent or 
stagnant. This, in turn, should reduce the threat associated with the perception of any 
form of injustice perpetuated by the system in its current form. 
This prediction was confirmed: participants in the high inevitability condition 
showed more support for social redistributive policies (M = 5.45, SD = 0.78) than 
participants in the low inevitability condition (M = 4.86, SD = 0.86), F(1, 39) = 5.24, p < 
.03. Table 3 presents more specific information on the means. Furthermore, neither the 
equality of the end result nor the interaction between the two factors came close to 
producing significant effects, both Fs < 1, ns. Including gender as a factor in the analysis 
led to no additional effects, all Fs < 1.68, all ps > .20, and made no difference to the main 
effect of change, F(1, 35) = 5.08, p = .03. Thus, all participants were less likely to be 
supportive of community service programs designed to redress societal inequality when 
they thought their system was inevitable – i.e., changing in an unrelated domain, 





This first study provided initial support for the idea that inevitability plays a key 
role in explaining people’s motivation to justify their system. I used an indirect 
behavioural measure of system justification (Wakslak et al., 2007), and showed that when 
I increased people’s sense that their system was inevitable, they were less willing to 
support, vote for funding for, volunteer for and donate money to various community 
service programs designed to redress the disadvantages suffered by certain target groups 
of people. Specifically, when participants were exposed to information suggesting that 
change was occurring in one particular domain governed by their system, they became 
more supportive of redistributive social programs designed to affect unrelated domains 
also governed by their system. This separation between the domain of change and the 
domain of justification is important, as it suggests that something about change itself, and 
not the specific content of change, is what matters. This idea is further bolstered by the 
observation that the direction of the change had no effect whatsoever, despite the fact 
that, as described in the pilot testing section above, participants likely did notice this 
direction. 
Indeed, this observation reduces the plausibility of one of the more compelling 
alternative explanations for the effects of change. A change leading to more equality 
could have served simply as a signal to participants that their society was becoming more 
equal, and for that reason could have lead them to express more support of redistributive 
social policies as a form of anticipatory rationalization (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002). This 
would hardly be a novel finding. However, given such an explanation, one would expect 
to observe the opposite trend following the suggestion of change leading to less equality, 
 
14 
namely, that participants would express less support for social redistributive programs. 
The present results are more consistent with the inevitability interpretation, which is that 
the simple presence of change, any change, decreased participants’ sense that their 
system in its current form would persist into the indefinite future, and thereby decreased 
their motivation to justify it. 
Thus, this first attempt at testing the general hypothesis was successful. 
Admittedly, however, it could be argued the conceptualization of inevitability in terms of 
change is similar to SIT’s concept of stability. Although I do not in any way mean to 
dispute the validity of previous approaches that have examined the effects of perceived 
system instability, I do hope to differentiate the present effects from these.  Thus, 
although it is not clear that SIT would have made the same predictions confirmed in 
Study 1, I thought it best for subsequent studies to use a different operationalization of 
inevitability. Moreover, given how I described the construct of inevitability throughout 
the introduction – that is, the sense that one’s system will continue to indefinitely exert its 
influence over one’s life – more precise operationalizations of this construct likely exist. 
In Study 2, therefore, I sought to move to a manipulation that was more distinct from the 




Study 2: System inescapability and helping the disadvantaged 
In Study 2, I manipulated inevitability by changing participants’ perceptions of 
how difficult it would be for them to leave their system. Specifically, I designed a simple 
manipulation where participants would read an excerpt, ostensibly taken from a Statistics 
Canada report, telling them that it was becoming either harder or easier to leave the 
country. This manipulation, I felt, was more obviously tied to the present conception of 
inevitability, and was less likely to overlap with the SIT construct of stability. I tried to 
empirically validate this intuition through a series of pilot tests, described in the results 
section below. 
I then assessed system justification using the same measure used in Study 1. In 
addition, prior to participating in the study, participants filled out two individual-
difference measures, assessing their Belief in a Just World (BJW) and their Protestant 
Work Ethic (PWE). I intended to use these measures as covariates in the analysis to 
strengthen the results, because (a) presumably such measures should be associated with 
participants’ a priori support for social redistributive programs, and (b) previous system 
justification research has shown that individuals who score high on scales such as these 
tend to show weaker or no system justification effects
1
 (e.g., Kay & Jost, 2003). 
In sum then, Study 2 was a 2-cell design (high inevitability vs. low inevitability) 
where I assessed the same dependent measure as in the previous study, namely, 
participants support for social redistributive programs. I predicted that participants in the 
high inevitability condition, who were made to feel that it would be difficult for them to 
leave their country, would show increased system justification, i.e., decreased support for 




Participants. Thirty-five Canadian citizens (15 men and 20 women; median age 
21; 69% Caucasian) were recruited from undergraduate courses at the University of 
Waterloo. They volunteered to participate, and in exchange received either a candy bar or 
course credit. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to volunteer for an online study about “global 
issues,” where they would be asked to give their opinions on various issues relevant to 
the global community. Approximately one week before the experimental session, 
participants were asked to complete scales designed to assess BJW and PWE, as well as 
to provide some demographic information. I used Lipkus’ (1991) seven-item Global BJW 
scale (α = .88), where participants rate items such as “I feel that people get what they 
deserve” and “I feel that people who meet with misfortune have brought it on 
themselves” on a scale ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 6 (strong agreement); 
and Quinn and Crocker’s (1999) 16-item PWE scale (α = .86), where participants rate 
items such as “if you want to be successful, all you have to do is work hard and improve 
yourself” and “people who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough” on a scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The full scales are presented in 
Appendices A and B, respectively. 
Upon beginning the experimental session, participants were randomly assigned by 
the study website to either the low inevitability condition or the high inevitability 
condition, and read a paragraph of information, framed as a recent research finding. This 
paragraph constituted the manipulation of inevitability. Specifically, participants read the 
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following passage. Where the conditions differed, text for the low inevitability condition 
is in brackets. 
Since the 1950s, a group at Harvard University, in Cambridge, has been using current 
political and international trends to predict patterns of population movements. Recent 
reports by this group of experts have indicated that people who wish to move out of 
Canada will find it increasingly difficult [easy] to do so, in the coming years. Thus, even 
if the number of Canadians wishing to leave and settle elsewhere remains constant, we 
should expect a significant slow-down [increase] over the next few years in terms of 
those who actually are able to do so. 
 
After answering a few filler questions designed to reinforce the stated purpose of 
the study, participants were then presented with the measure of system justification used 
in Study 1. Because participants’ responses were highly intercorrelated, yielding a 
Cronbach’s α of .94, an average score was created to serve as the dependent variable. 
Finally, participants were compensated, thanked and fully debriefed. 
Results 
Pilot testing. Separate samples of participants were exposed to the inevitability 
paragraphs, and asked to fill out various measures, to confirm the specificity of the 
manipulation. According to the present hypothesis, people should be more motivated to 
justify inevitable systems because they should see the current conditions of these systems 
as more likely to affect them in the future. In pre-testing, therefore, I sought to ensure this 
construct was affected by the manipulation. I also wanted to ensure the manipulations 
were not affecting other constructs that could drive the results but that I was not 
interested in here, such as mood or identification with Canada. 
In one sample, participants were exposed to one of the two versions of the 
inevitability paragraph above, and then rated their sense that the Canadian system in its 
current form had control over their outcomes. They did so by rating their agreement with 
the two following statements on a scale ranging from 1 (strong disagreement) to 9 
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(strong agreement): “The current Canadian government exerts a great deal of control 
over my prospects for the future” and “The decisions made right now by the current 
Canadian government are likely to have at least some impact on my future.” As 
predicted, participants subjected to the high inevitability manipulation rated these items 
higher (M = 6.74, SE = 0.29) than participants subjected to the low inevitability 
manipulation (M = 5.87, SE = 0.29), F(1, 43) = 4.52, p < .04. 
A second sample of participants was exposed to the same manipulation, and 
subsequently rated how difficult they thought it would be to leave Canada in the next 10 
years, using a scale ranging from 1 (extremely easy) to 9 (extremely difficult). They also 
completed standard measures of mood (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) and 
of group identity (Cameron, 2004), and rated items related to positive perceptions of 
Canadian people (e.g., “In general, Canadians are competent people”). The full measures 
are presented in Appendices C, D and E, respectively. 
Consistent with predictions, participants exposed to the high inevitability 
manipulation were indeed more likely to think it would be difficult for them to leave 
Canada in the next 10 years, (M = 5.56, SE = 0.49) compared to participants subjected to 
the low inevitability manipulation (M = 4.14, SE = 0.49), F(1, 45) = 3.97, p = .05. 
However, there was no sign that this perception was accompanied by increased Canadian 
identification (Mhigh inevitability = 5.11, SEhigh inevitability = 0.15; Mlow inevitability = 4.97, SE low 
inevitability = 0.16), F(1, 45) < 1, ns or more positive perceptions of Canadian people, 
whether analyzed individually, nor as a composite score (Mhigh inevitability= 5.03, SEhigh 
inevitability = .17; Mlow inevitability = 5.06, SElow inevitability = .17), all Fs < 1, ns, further ruling out 
the likelihood any effects obtained were driven primarily by social identity needs. 
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Finally, the manipulation had no discernable effect on positive (Mhigh inevitability = 2.65, 
SEhigh inevitability = 0.19; Mlow inevitability = 2.56, SElow inevitability = 0.19) or negative (Mhigh 
inevitability = 1.62, SEhigh inevitability = 0.14; Mlow inevitability = 1.65, SElow inevitability = 0.14) mood, 
both Fs < 1, ns. In other words, the manipulation showed effects that were specific to 
those variables which I expected to be affected, and had no influence on variables 
unrelated to the specific hypothesis tested here.  
Primary analyses. Recall the main prediction, which was that participants in the 
high inevitability condition, compared to those in the low inevitability condition, would 
show increased system justification, as evidenced by decreased support for programs 




As predicted, participants in the high inevitability condition were less likely to 
support various redistributive social programs (M = 5.35, SE = 0.16) than participants in 
the low inevitability condition (M = 6.00, SE = 0.15) F(1, 31) = 8.40, p < .01. Including 
gender as a factor in the analysis led to no additional effects, all Fs < 1.17, all ps > .28, 
and left the main effect of change strong, F(1, 29) = 7.36, p < .02.  Thus, increasing 
inevitability by manipulating the difficulty of leaving the system also led people to be 
less likely to be supportive of community service programs designed to redress societal 
inequality. 
Discussion 
Using a more precise manipulation of inevitability and the same dependent 
measure as Study 1, this second study provided additional support for the idea that 
inevitability plays a key role in explaining people’s motivation to justify their system. 
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Importantly, pilot testing ruled out a number of potential alternative explanations. On the 
one hand, the manipulation had no discernable effect on people’s identification with 
Canada, as indexed by Cameron’s (2004) Canadian Identity scale, nor on their 
perceptions of Canadians, indicating that the effects on system justification are not likely 
reducible to purely social-identity-based processes. On the other hand, the manipulation 
did affect variables consistent with the theoretical position described here: participants’ 
concrete sense that they would have difficulty leaving their country, and their more 
abstract sense that the system’s current form would continue to exert influence over their 
lives. 
It is possible, however, that the results of Studies 1 and 2 could be explained by a 
cognitive-inferential (i.e., non-motivational) account, one which I have not yet 
considered. One could reasonably argue, that is, that the evidence of increased 
justification observed thus far is not due to an increased motive to deny injustice, as I 
propose, but instead to a lay theory people may hold suggesting that more inevitable 
systems must be fairer systems. Thus, in Studies 1 and 2, participants told that things in 
Canada were not going to change, or that it would be difficult for them to leave Canada, 
could have inferred based on this information that Canada must be a fairer place than 
those not given this information. Study 3 was designed to rule out this inferential account. 
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Study 3: System inescapability and gender inequality 
When an incontrovertible difference is said to exist between the outcomes of two 
groups – for instance, when there is a discrepancy in financial outcomes – two different 
classes of explanations can be called on to explain it. On the one hand, genuine 
differences between the groups in terms of relevant attributes can be invoked – for 
instance, one might argue that one group is harder-working or more naturally talented 
than the other. Such explanations can be said to be system justifying, because they 
absolve the system of any suspicion of bias in the distribution of outcomes. On the other 
hand, discrimination and prejudice form another class of explanations that may be 
invoked to explain a difference in groups’ outcomes – this type of explanation can be said 
to be system blaming, as it directly attributes the differential outcomes to unfairness. 
Thus, to the extent that one is motivated to justify one’s system, one would prefer to 
appeal to system justifying explanations (i.e., genuine differences exist between the 
groups that legitimize their differential outcomes), rather than system blaming ones (i.e., 
the groups’ differential outcomes are due to systemic unfairness). I capitalized on this 
reasoning in the design of Study 3, by using endorsements of various explanations for 
inequality as the measure of system justification. Importantly, employing a different, but 
conceptually overlapping, dependent measure provides further evidence that inevitability 
affects people’s general level of system justification, and helps to rule out the possibility 
that the effects observed in Studies 1 and 2 were specific to some other component of 
people’s willingness to support social redistributive programs. 
In Study 3, then, I used the same inevitability manipulation as used in Study 2, 
and then assessed people’s explanations for a social inequality. Specifically, I predicted 
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that increasing people’s perceptions of the difficulty associated with leaving a system 
would lead them to be more inclined to attribute a group difference to genuine 
differences between groups, and less inclined to attribute it to unfairness – that is, under 
conditions of increased inevitability, I again expect participants to increasingly rely upon 
system justifying explanations for social inequality. To test this prediction, I led 
participants to believe that there was an important difference between the financial 
outcomes of Canadian men and women, and that this difference favoured men. I then 
measured their endorsement of both a system justifying explanation for this state of 
affairs as well as a system blaming one. Consistent with the results from Studies 1 and 2, 
I expected that participants in the high inevitability condition would endorse the system 
justifying explanation more strongly, and the system blaming one less strongly.  
The main purpose of Study 3, however, was not to introduce a new dependent 
measure, although this will help demonstrate the breadth of the effects of inevitability. Its 
primary purpose was, in fact, to consider the inferential account of the findings outlined 
above, which would suggest that the effects were simply due to people’s lay theory that 
inevitable systems tend to be more fair. In order to rule out this explanation, I expanded 
the procedure to include conditions where the system in question was not one which held 
sway over participants’ lives; a technique that has been employed by other researchers to 
rule out non-motivational explanations of other related phenomena (e.g., Major et al., 
2007). Specifically, half of the participants were exposed to the same high inevitability 
manipulation as used in Study 2, whereas the other half were exposed to the same 
manipulation, but framed in Germany instead of Canada. For the sake of simplicity, 
Study 3 did not include low inevitability conditions. In a subsequent task, an orthogonal 
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half of the participants were asked to explain a gender inequality said to exist within the 
Canadian system, whereas the remainder were asked to explain the same inequality said 
to exist within the German system. 
The inferential explanation of the data presented thus far predicts that participants 
should be affected by information regarding a system’s inevitability regardless of the 
particular relevance of the system to their own outcomes. In other words, this account 
should predict that when the German system is perceived as highly inevitable, German 
inequalities should be more strongly justified, even by Canadian participants who are 
unlikely to feel threatened by the presence of inequality within the German system. 
In contrast, the hypothesis developed throughout this thesis would predict that the 
effects of inevitability manipulations should depend on people feeling that their own lives 
will continue to be affected by the system in question, and on them feeling that they 
themselves might suffer negative consequences as a result of the injustice in question. 
Thus, whereas participants made to believe that Canada is a highly inevitable system 
should be more inclined to justify the Canadian system, inducing in participants the belief 
that the German system is highly inevitable should have no discernible effect on the 
rationalization of inequalities within either system. 
In short, although the inferential account should predict increased justification of 
the German system when Germany is said to be inevitable, the present hypothesis 
predicts no such difference. Study 3 uses this contrast to rule out the inferential account 
of the findings outlined in Studies1 and 2. I used a mixed model design, with country of 
high inevitability (Canada vs. Germany) and country of gender discrepancy (Canada vs. 
Germany) as between-subjects factors, and explanation type (system justifying vs. system 
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blaming) as the within-subject factor. I predicted that (Canadian) participants led to 
perceive the Canadian system as highly inevitable will justify a Canadian inequality to a 
greater extent – that is, endorse the system justifying explanation for this inequality more 
strongly and the system blaming explanation less strongly. In contrast, I expected to see 
no inevitability-based differences in participants’ justification of the German inequality. 
Method 
Participants. Sixty-two Canadian citizens were recruited from undergraduate 
psychology courses at the University of Waterloo. The present hypothesis specifies that, 
because it operates by increasing one’s personal vulnerability to the ill consequences of 
unfairness, inevitability should affect justification of only those inequalities which could 
lead to aversive consequences for oneself. Study 4 will provide a closer examination of 
this prediction, but for Study 3, given that the dependent measure referred to an 
inequality that put women at a disadvantage, I recruited female participants only. They 
volunteered to participate in exchange for course credit. 
Procedure. Participants were asked to volunteer for an online study about 
“reasoning styles,” where they would be asked to “reason about a number of situations 
drawn from the real world,” by reading about a particular state of affairs and then 
explaining why they thought it might exist. After explaining an irrelevant “filler” state of 
affairs about the popularity of midsized cars, participants read about a second state of 
affairs, which was the high inevitability manipulation from Study 2, with a few minor 
adjustments. Specifically, half of the participants read the paragraph as if it referred to 
Germany, whereas the other half read it as if it referred to Canada – the study website 
randomly assigned participants to one condition or the other. Participants were then asked 
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to explain this state of high or low inevitability, which could incidentally have served to 
reinforce the manipulation because participants were made to came up with plausible 
reasons of their own for why this state might exist (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). 
Participants then moved on to the final state of affairs, which was the description 
of the gender discrepancy. I directly manipulated participants’ sense that they themselves 
might eventually be on the disadvantaged end of this discrepancy, by framing it as being 
the status quo in either Canada or Germany – condition was once again randomly 
determined by the study website. Specifically, participants read the following passage. 
Where the conditions differed, text for the German gender discrepancy condition is in 
brackets. 
According to Statistics Canada [a prominent German statistical analysis center], male 
university graduates in this [that] country are more financially successful than their 
female counterparts. For instance, Canadian [German] female graduates are paying off 
their debt more slowly than their male counterparts. To illustrate, in Canada [Germany] 
60% of males completely pay off their student debt within 2 years. In contrast, only 25% 
of women manage such a feat. In addition, these men’s salaries upon entering their first 
job after graduating are a full 20% higher than women’s starting salaries. 
 
They then filled out the measure of system justification, which asked them to rate 
their agreement with both a genuine differences explanation for the relevant inequality 
(specifically, “genuine differences between men and women” – i.e., a system justifying 
explanation), and an unfairness explanation (specifically, “unfairness in Canadian 
society” – i.e., a system-blaming explanation) for the gender discrepancy. Participants 
rated the extent to which each explanation accounted for the discrepancy on a scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (almost entirely). Finally, participants also completed 
scales designed to assess BJW (α = .76) and PWE (α = .80), as in Study 2. Participants 





Table 5 summarizes participants’ responses to both the system justifying and the 
system blaming explanations, in each condition
3
. Analyses revealed two significant 
effects among these responses. First of all, participants were more likely to endorse the 
“unfair” explanation than the “genuine differences” explanation, F(1, 56) = 3.15, p < 
.04
4
. This may reflect the fact that this sample of university students was likely more 
liberal than conservative, or the fact that the inequality was described in fairly categorical 
terms that may have been particularly difficult for participants to rationalize. However, as 
predicted, this main effect was qualified by a three-way interaction between country of 
high inevitability, country of gender discrepancy and explanation type, F(1,56) = 30.36, p 
= .01. 
Follow-up analyses confirmed my prediction, which was that the manipulation of 
Canadian inevitability would increase participants’ justification of a Canadian inequality, 
but that participants’ justification of a German inequality would be unaffected by the 
manipulations. Indeed, analyzing participants’ justification of a Canadian inequality, I 
found a country of high inevitability X explanation type interaction, F(1, 56) = 4.23, p < 
.05, that unfolded in the expected fashion. Compared to women led to believe that the 
German system was highly inevitable, women led to believe that the Canadian system 
was highly inevitable viewed the system justifying explanation marginally more 
favourably (MGerman  inevitability = 4.36, SEGerman  inevitability = 0.58, MCanadian inevitability = 5.35, 
SECanadian inevitability = 0.53), F(1, 56) = 2.81, p < .10, and the system blaming explanation 
less favourably(MGerman  inevitability = 6.75, SEGerman  inevitability = 0.44, MCanadian inevitability = 
5.50, SECanadian inevitability = 0.41), F(1, 56) = 4.48, p < .04. 
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In contrast, participants’ justification of a German inequality was unaffected by 
the inevitability manipulation: the country of inevitability X explanation type did not 
approach significance, F(1, 56) = 2.56, p > .11. Indeed, neither the system justifying 
explanation (MGerman  inevitability = 4.14, SEGerman  inevitability = 0.58, MCanadian inevitability = 3.13, 
SECanadian inevitability = 0.53), nor the system blaming explanation (MGerman  inevitability = 6.08, 
SEGerman  inevitability = 0.58, MCanadian inevitability = 6.69, SECanadian inevitability = 0.53) showed 
reliable differences based on country of inevitability, both Fs < 1.99, both ps > .16. Thus, 
the data are consistent with a motivational account of the data, but not with an inferential 
one: an inferential process should have applied equally to participants’ explanations of a 
German inequality. This pattern also reflects the importance of the self-relevance of the 
injustice being rationalized: a sense that their system was inevitable did not lead 
participants to justify all inequalities in the world, only those from which they themselves 
might eventually suffer. 
Figure 1 presents a more graphic representation of these results. For ease of 
presentation, this figure presents the difference between participants’ endorsements of the 
system justifying explanation and the system blaming explanation. Of particular note, of 
all groups of participants, the only ones who failed to show a significant preference for 
the system blaming explanation were women who (a) were evaluating a Canadian gender 
discrepancy and (b) thought that Canada was a highly inevitable system, F(1, 56) < 1, ns. 
Participants in all other conditions endorsed the system blaming explanation more 






Overall then, the prediction was borne out in this study, which provided 
converging evidence using a different measure of system justification. Increased 
inevitability of the Canadian system led, as expected, to increased justification of a 
Canadian inequality. In contrast, increased inevitability of the German system made no 
difference to justification of a German inequality. Once again, this occurred despite the 
fact that the discrepancy was described in identical terms for all participants. These data 
tip the scales away from a possible cognitive inferential account of findings from Studies 
1 and 2, and bolster the credibility of the motivational account of these findings. 
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Study 4: System inescapability and gender inequality: A test of mechanism 
With three studies in support of the general hypothesis, and one alternative 
explanation effectively ruled out, I designed a fourth and final study to more precisely 
investigate the presumed mechanism of the effect. Recall that in developing this 
hypothesis I reasoned that people would find unfairness threatening under conditions of 
inevitability because of the increased possibility that they themselves might be affected 
by it. Of course, the most direct way to test the relevance of threat would be if I could ask 
participants to rate how threatened they felt by various injustices that could or could not 
target them, under conditions of high or low inevitability. However, such a 
straightforward endeavour becomes more complicated when one considers that the very 
nature of threat makes it difficult to acknowledge, even to oneself, and that processes of 
threat-defence, in general, are presumed to operate below levels of conscious awareness 
(e.g., McGregor & Jordan, 2007). 
Study 4 took an alternative route, then, and tested the proposed mechanism using 
both moderation and mediation (cf. Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). This involved a two-
pronged approach. The first exploited the fact that my hypothesis was based on the idea 
that increased inevitability leads to increased justification because it heightens fears that a 
specific injustice could negatively impact the self. For this reason, to the extent that a 
given injustice could not possibly have a negative impact on a given individual, I would 
expect that the individual should never feel particularly threatened by the perception of it, 
regardless of the level of inevitability.  
In Studies 1 and 2, the measure of system justification referred to injustices that 
were non-specific enough that they might conceivably affect everyone at some stage in 
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their lives, and were certainly not restricted to one gender; therefore, all participants, 
regardless of gender, increased their justification under conditions of increased 
inevitability. In Study 3, I observed female participants’ justification of a gender 
inequality. As described in the methods section above, I chose to recruit only female 
participants because my hypothesis should predict that men’s justification of the gender 
inequality should be unaffected by inevitability. Indeed, if inevitability operates, as I 
contend, by increasing an individual’s vulnerability to the injustices present in the 
system, then I would expect it to affect justification of only those injustices to which that 
individual could possibly be vulnerable. Study 4 provided a more precise test of this idea, 
by using the same measure of system justification as in Study 3, but including both 
female and male participants. I predicted a moderational pattern, such that male 
participants’ justification of the gender inequality would show no inevitability-based 
differences. 
The second prong of my approach relied on statistical mediation. In order to 
ensure that the effect was being driven by participants’ actual sense that their current 
system was likely to continue to exert its influence on them, I measured their sense of 
how difficult it would be for them to leave their country. I measured this sense in pilot 
testing described above and found, as expected, that inevitability increased it; however, 
because I did not measure outcome variables in these samples, I was unable to test for 
mediation. In Study 4, I was able to test the prediction that the effects of the manipulation 
on system justification would be driven directly by people’s sense that they would 
continue to be subjected to the influence of their system.  
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Finally, Study 4 allowed me to rule out one alternative explanation to findings 
from Study 3. In Study 3, I suggested that the absence of any effect of the inevitability 
manipulation in the Germany condition demonstrated that the observed results in the 
Canadian condition were not simply due to a purely cognitive process in which people 
merely inferred that inescapable systems are, for some reason, more fair. However, it 
might be possible to argue that the data would still be consistent with the inferential 
account if it were the case that participants in Study 3 for some reason simply did not 
believe the inevitability manipulation when it referred to Germany rather than Canada. If 
this were the case, then they would have had no reason to make the inference that 
Germany was more fair, in the inevitable condition, and I would expect to see the pattern 
of results that was obtained. To the extent that male participants in Study 4 do show that 
they believe the manipulation (that is, to the extent that the manipulation does lead them 
to view Canada as less escapable), and still fail to show an effect on the justification of 
women’s disadvantaged status, this alternative explanation can be dismissed. 
Thus, similarly to Study 3, Study 4 employed a mixed model design with 
inevitability (high vs. low) and gender (male vs. female) as between-subjects factors, and 
explanation type (system justifying vs. system blaming) as the within-subject factor. I 
assessed the extent to which participants thought it would be difficult for them to leave 
their system, as well as their endorsement of a system justifying explanation and a system 
blaming explanation for a gender discrepancy in financial outcomes. I expected that 
women, but not men, would rationalize the inequality more strongly – that is, increase 
their endorsements of the system justifying explanation and decrease their endorsements 
of the system blaming explanation – in the high inevitability condition, compared to the 
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low inevitability condition. Further, I expected that this effect among women would be 
driven by perception of the difficulty associated with escaping their system. 
Method 
Participants. Fifty-four Canadian citizens (28 women, 26 men) were recruited 
from a public venue on campus. All participants completed the survey booklet on site and 
received a chocolate bar for participating. 
Procedure. Participants volunteered for a study on “the effectiveness of written 
communication.” The experimenter, who was blind to condition, handed them a booklet 
containing instructions and study materials, and sent them to a quiet area to complete 
materials on their own. They read one of the two paragraphs of information, determined 
by their assignment to either the low or high inevitability condition. These paragraphs 
constituted the manipulation of inevitability, and were essentially identical to those 
described in Study 2, albeit slightly longer: ostensibly produced by Statistics Canada, 
they depicted Canada as a country that is either very difficult or very easy to leave. 
Participants then answered a series of reading comprehension questions, in which 
was embedded the potential mediator. Specifically, I asked participants to rate how hard 
they thought it would be for them to move out of Canada in the next 10 years, using a 
scale ranging from 1 (very easy) to 9 (very difficult). I predicted that these mobility 
ratings would mediate the expected effects on system justification. 
Next, participants read another ostensible Statistics Canada article, which was 
designed to lead them to believe that men enjoyed better financial outcomes than women. 
This passage closely paralleled the one used in Study, although it too was slightly longer. 
The critical passages were as follows: 
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[…] 60% of males completely pay off their student debt within 2 years of 
graduating. In contrast, only 25% of women manage such a feat. While it is likely 
that some of this difference is due to the fact that some women may choose to work less 
or not at all for maternity reasons, at least part of the difference could be due to gender 
discrepancies in post-graduation occupational success[…] men’s starting salaries are a 
full 20% higher than women’s starting salaries. In addition, while men’s academic 
success is related to their income and success at finding a job during the first five years 
following graduation (with those who got better grades ending up with more and better-
paying jobs), women’s academic achievements appear to be unrelated to their job-
market success, with superstar female graduates showing no advantage over mediocre 
female graduates […] 
 
The same two items as in Study 3 were used to assess participants’ justification of 
the gender discrepancy, specifically, their endorsements of the same system blaming and 
system justifying explanations. Participants then returned to the experimenter’s booth, 
were thanked, compensated and fully debriefed. 
Results 
Moderation by gender. I predicted that women in the high inevitability condition 
would show more system justification, compared to women in the low inevitability 
condition, but that men would show no such difference. Specifically, I expected women 
to endorse the system justifying explanation more strongly, and the system blaming 
explanation less strongly, under conditions of increased inevitability. Table 6 presents 
participants’ responses to the system justifying and system blaming explanations, across 
both conditions. Analysis of participants’ endorsements first uncovered an overall effect 
of explanation type similar to that observed in Study 3, F(1, 49) = 8.96, p < .005, such 
that overall, participants preferred the system blaming explanation to the system 
justifying explanation
5
. However, this effect was qualified by a three-way interaction 
with gender, F(1, 49) = 5.74, p = .02. Follow-up analyses conducted for each gender 
revealed that men’s system justification was not affected by the inevitability 
manipulation: the inevitability X explanation type interaction did not approach 
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significance, F(1, 49) < 1, ns. In contrast, the explanation type X condition interaction for 
women was robust, F(1, 49) = 8.37, p < .006. 
This interaction unfolded in the predicted direction: women in the high 
inevitability condition were more likely to justify the system, compared to women in the 
low inevitability condition. They were both more likely to endorse the system justifying 
explanation (Mlow  inevitability = 3.07, SDlow inevitability = 2.30, Mhigh inevitability = 5.23, SDhigh 
inevitability = 1.96), F(1, 49) = 8.45, p < .006, and marginally less likely to endorse the 
system blaming explanation (Mlow  inevitability = 6.43, SDlow inevitability = 1.65, Mhigh inevitability = 
5.15, SDhigh inevitability = 2.03), F(1, 49) = 2.95, p < .10.  
Importantly, further analyses showed that the differences between men and 
women in terms of the effect of inevitability on their justification of a gender inequality 
cannot be explained by differences between the genders in terms of the effectiveness of 
the manipulation. Both women (Mlow inevitability = 2.43, SDlow inevitability = 2.24, Mhigh inevitability 
= 6.57, SDhigh inevitability = 1.74, F(1, 26) = 29.8, p < .001) and men (Mlow inevitability = 2.50, 
SDlow inevitability = 1.51, Mhigh inevitability = 5.07, SDhigh inevitability = 2.17, F(1, 24) = 11.9, p < 
.01) thought it would be more difficult for them to leave the country in the high 
inevitability condition, compared to the low inevitability condition. 
Figure 2 provides a visual representation of these results, again presenting the 
difference between endorsements of the system justifying and of the system blaming 
explanations. The pattern bears a striking resemblance to the pattern observed in Study 3: 
whereas in the high inevitability condition women endorsed the two explanations equally, 
F(1, 49) < 1, ns, women in the low inevitability condition were much more likely to 
endorse the system blaming explanation than the system justifying explanation, F(1, 49) 
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= 16.61, p < .001. Men showed an intermediate pattern; however, women in the high 
inevitability condition were the only ones whose mean difference score was above 0, 
although not significantly so. 
Mediational analyses. Recall that I also predicted that the effect of inevitability on 
women’s explanations would be explained by their perceptions of how difficult it would 
be for them to leave their country. Given that the direct effect of inevitability was 
strongest on endorsements of the system justifying explanation, analyses were conducted 
using these endorsements as the dependent variable
6
. Two separate regressions showed 
an effect of the inevitability manipulation on women’s perceptions that it would be 
difficult for them to leave Canada in the coming years, β = .73, t(26) = 5.46, p < .001, and 
on their endorsement of the system justifying explanation, β = .46, t(26) = 2.61, p < .02. 
These analyses indicated that following the high inevitability manipulation, compared to 
the low inevitability manipulation, women felt that it would be more difficult for them to 
leave Canada (Ms = 6.57 and 2.43, SDs = 1.74 and 2.26, respectively), and were more 
inclined to justify the inequality (Ms = 5.23 and 3.07, SDs = 1.96 and 2.30, respectively). 
When condition and perceived difficulty of leaving Canada were entered 
simultaneously into the regression to predict women’s system justification, the direct 
association between inevitability and women’s endorsements of the system justifying 
explanation was reduced to nonsignificance, β = .29, t(26) = 1.12, p > .3, whereas the 
association between perceived difficulty of leaving Canada and women’s system 
justification remained strong, ß = .45, t(26) = 2.53, p < .02. The significance of this 
indirect path was confirmed by a Sobel test, Sobel = 2.30, p < .03 (see Figure 2). 
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In other words, the effect of the manipulation of inevitability on women’s 
endorsement of a system justifying explanation was mediated by their perceptions of how 
difficult it would be for them to leave Canada in the coming years.  
Discussion 
Thus, this fourth study corroborates the findings obtained in Studies 1 through 3. 
More importantly, however, Study 4 also provides further evidence that the effects of 
inevitability documented above occurred for the specific reasons hypothesized. Recall 
that I reasoned that people would find unfairness threatening under conditions of high 
inevitability because of the increased possibility that they themselves might be affected 
by it. In support of this reasoning, I found that when inevitability was low – i.e., when it 
was said to be easy to leave the country – women were more apt to blame their 
disadvantaged status on their country than to attribute it to legitimating reasons. 
However, under conditions of heightened inevitability, women were just as likely to 
endorse explanations that made their disadvantage legitimate as they were to blame it on 
unfairness. 
The explanations provided by men for women’s disadvantaged status, on the other 
hand, showed no such effect of inevitability. This is consistent with the idea that threat is 
a necessary component to the increased justification associated with perceptions of 
inevitability – men would have had no reason to feel threatened by a description of 
women’s disadvantaged status, and therefore according to my reasoning should not have 
been particularly motivated to justify it under any circumstances. Importantly, a 
mediational analysis carried out on men’s responses bolstered this interpretation. The 
manipulation did affect men’s perceptions of how difficult it would be for them to leave 
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the country, ß = .58, t(25) = 3.45, p < .01, as mentioned above; however, these 
perceptions were not associated with men’s system justification, ß = -.11, t(25) < 1, ns. 
Study 4 also supports the proposed mechanism through the mediational path that I 
found in the data: the effect of the manipulation on women’s system justification was 
driven directly by their perceptions of how difficult it would be for them to leave the 
country. When considered in combination with the pilot testing described in Study 2, I 
can now be more confident that the manipulation used here not only specifically targets 
the sense of the system’s continuing presence, leaving identity-related variables 





Across four different studies I provided consistent evidence that the more people 
perceive their system as inevitable – either inescapable or unlikely to change – the more 
they are motivated to justify it. In Study 1, I manipulated inevitability by highlighting the 
occurrence or absence of change, and found that a system characterized by change 
resulted in more support for social redistributive policies (that is, less system 
justification). In Study 2, I replicated this finding using a more precise manipulation of 
inevitability, exploiting people’s perceptions of how difficult it would be for them to 
leave their country. In Study 3, I ruled out an alternative, cognitive inferential account of 
these findings, and provided converging evidence using a different measure of system 
justification. Finally, in Study 4, I elaborated on mechanism, by providing a mediational 
pathway consistent with my account, and by finding moderation of the effect: 
inevitability only increases rationalization of injustices from which one could potentially 
suffer. The fact that I observed this same pattern using two different manipulations and 
two different dependent variables attests to the breadth of inevitability effects on the 
motivation to justify the system. 
Implications for system justification theory 
I believe that the major contribution of this research to system justification theory 
is that it represents an important conceptual refinement of the more basic form of the 
theory’s main tenet: that people are motivated to see their systems as more fair and just 
than objective circumstances may warrant. Identifying the conditions that are most likely 
to elicit this motivation, as I have begun to do here, is an essential first step to 
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understanding the reasons underlying it. Achieving such a level of understanding of 
human motivations is an ultimate goal of much of social psychology. Indeed, although 
not stated precisely in these terms, my reasoning implies a belief that inevitability is in 
fact a cause of system justification. The idea that people’s motivation to justify their 
systems arises from, on the one hand, the belief that these systems affect important 
outcomes for them, and on the other hand, are likely to continue to have these effects 
indefinitely, is one that I find logically sensible. 
Another idea that has run through the present set of studies, without being stated 
as a specific prediction, relates to the importance of threat to the self in the motivation to 
justify the system. Across the present studies, emphasis was repeatedly placed on the 
threat associated with the perception of unfairness – I argued that the effects of 
inevitability operate by increasing the chance that unfairness in the system could 
eventually lead to undesirable consequences for the self. Bolstering this contention, twice 
I found a predicted pattern of moderation such that, although the manipulations I used 
were successful in increasing everyone’s sense that the system’s influence was likely to 
continue for quite some time, this only affected justification of injustices that could 
eventually target the self. Although I am not trying to make the case that the motivation 
to justify the system is completely reducible to self-interest, these findings do suggest that 
people’s concern for their own fair treatment might play an important role. 
Finally, one important question arising out of this research concerns the extent to 
which inevitability is a constant frame of mind in everyday life. The sheer quantity of 
experimental evidence accumulated in defence of system justification theory suggests 
that perceptions of inevitability, if it is to be considered a cause of system justification, 
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must be equally pervasive. Indeed, I suggest that people’s typical, default assumption is 
one of inevitability. This assumption may vary in strength depending on the particular 
system in question, but certainly leaving a system as important as one’s country is 
associated with many costs – social costs, the financial burden incurred by such a move, 
the difficulty that can be associated with finding new employment, the hassle of adjusting 
to the laws and customs of a new country, and many more. But even leaving seemingly 
lesser systems can be painful – it typically involves finding an alternative system, 
abandoning or at least weakening many social relationships, and disrupting daily routines. 
For most people in many types of systems, these costs probably appear too extreme to 
incur simply to escape a potential injustice, especially one that could instead be 
rationalized at no apparent cost. For many people, in fact, the costs are probably so great 
that the option to leave simply does not exist. 
Furthermore, it is likely that people’s personal experience would lead them to 
think that systemic change, if it ever occurs, is introduced at such an excruciatingly slow 
pace that it is not a viable hope to rely on in the face of injustice. Achieving significant 
and systemic change in an established system requires the support of most of the 
population, or at least of most of the people in high places. The kind of promotion that 
would be required to attain either of these levels of support would take more time, money 
and/or contacts than most people have at their disposal.  
Distinguishing inevitability from other constructs 
Two constructs arising from Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
deserve consideration here as they seem at least on the surface to have the potential to 
account for some of the present findings. It is important to note, however, that although 
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these approaches are complementary with mine in many ways (see Spears, Jetten, & 
Doojse, 2001), and the present findings may at a broad level provide novel support for 
certain aspects of the SIT framework, they are not redundant with it. First, SIT highlights 
the importance of group permeability (i.e., the potential for individuals to switch their 
membership from one group to another, or the inevitability of their membership to their 
current group) in determining the actions of low-status group members. In particular it is 
suggested that permeable group boundaries lead to a preference for individual mobility 
over collective action to better the status of the group (Ellemers, van Knippenberg, & 
Wilke, 1990), and that  impermeable group boundaries lead to the deployment of 
psychological strategies to enhance the group’s perceived value (e.g., Jackson, Sullivan, 
Harnish & Hodge, 1996). 
This research is consistent with the notion that the impermeability of group 
boundaries, or the inevitability of people’s membership to the group, could introduce a 
positive bias in their evaluation of this group. From this perspective, one might be 
tempted to reframe findings from Studies 2 through 4 as demonstrations that when people 
felt that their membership to the Canadian (or university) “group” was inevitable, they, 
driven by social identity needs, subsequently displayed a positive bias towards this group, 
specifically by psychologically enhancing its fairness. 
I believe that this temptation should be resisted for at least three reasons. First, I 
failed to find any evidence that the inevitability manipulations affected identification with 
the system, which has been an important dependent measure and theoretical construct in 
much permeability research (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1990). The fact that this variable was 
not affected by the inevitability manipulation erodes the credibility of the argument that 
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the present effect was simply a permeability effect. Similarly, this manipulation also 
failed to affect perceptions of Canadians as a group and the initiatives of their fellow 
students. The fact that the inevitability manipulation made participants justify the fairness 
of their system, but not evaluate its constituents more positively in other ways, makes it 
unlikely that this manipulation simply induced a general positive bias towards the system, 
as would be expected under a permeability account. The manipulations did, on the other 
hand, have consistent effects on people’s belief in the continuing influence of their 
system. One reason why SIT principles may not have been observable in the present 
studies is that, with the exception of Study 3, there was no salient outgroup to trigger 
Social Identity concerns with regards to the “ingroup” of the Canadian or university 
system. In fact, in Study 4, an alternative social group (gender) was made very salient, 
making it unlikely, in my view, that participants were preoccupied with the part of their 
social identity that was tied to the Canadian “group.” 
Second, the permeability account of the present data would more likely have 
made the opposite prediction for Study 2: impermeable group boundaries are typically 
associated with more collective action for the betterment of the group (Ellemers et al., 
1990). In other words, when people cannot escape the Canadian “group,” they should 
arguably have been more inclined to support policies designed to improve life in Canada, 
whereas I found the exact opposite. 
Finally, the permeability account of the present data cannot, in my view, explain 
the importance of the threat associated with the perception of unfairness, at least not as it 
was manipulated in Study 4. If impermeable boundaries lead group members to have 
more positive perceptions of their group, then I would have expected all Canadians, 
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regardless of gender, to show more positive perceptions of the Canadian “group,” and 
make more system justifying attributions of the gender inequality, when inevitability was 
high. Instead, I saw only women make such attributions under conditions of high 
inevitability, whereas men’s perceptions of Canada were unaffected by the permeability 
of Canada’s boundaries. 
There is, however, some notable overlap between my theoretical position and the 
related social identity concept of cognitive alternatives, illustrated by the findings of 
Turner and Brown (1978) described earlier. The general idea illustrated by these findings 
is that when members of low-status groups cannot perceive cognitive alternatives to the 
hierarchy of which their group is a part – i.e., when they perceive their system as 
inevitable – they will tend to accept their low status, and perhaps even justify it (Spears et 
al., 2001). Although I do not dispute that specific effect, there are still notable differences 
between past data and theory and what I have presented here. First, it is not clear, for 
example, that the original SIT formulation was meant to encompass effects such as those 
observed in Study 1, where the domain in which participants were led to believe the 
system was changing had nothing to do with the ways in which they subsequently 
displayed system justification. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, the notion of 
cognitive alternatives, although seemingly quite similar to the concept of inevitability, 
represents a fundamentally different way of thinking about these issues. Namely, SIT 
considers the legitimacy of the overarching system and the inevitability of the group 
hierarchy to be independent from one another; whereas from my perspective, the 
legitimacy of the system is, at least in part, a function of inevitability. These differences 
in theoretical orientation may explain why, in the 30 or so years since the birth of SIT, 
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there has never been a set of studies similar to the ones presented here, where perceptions 
of fairness and legitimacy represent the dependent variable and inevitability is 
operationalized as escapability.   
Thus, although SIT can offer many insights into the kinds of questions explored in 
the research reported here, and certain aspects of the present findings may represent 
intriguing support for some tenets of SIT, the results and theory presented here, I believe, 
provide a novel contribution to the literature.  
Concluding remarks 
In summary, the research presented here presents a strong case that system 
justification is increased, and perhaps even partially caused, by the perceptions that the 
system is inevitable. This is an important finding because it suggests that system 
justification effects – which are often negative – could be erased or at least reduced by 
reminding people that the system is not inevitable, by minimizing the obstacles to 
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1
 Presumably this occurs because individual beliefs – either in a just world or in the protestant work ethic –
can be system justifying in themselves, and thus remove the need for alternative methods of satisfying the 
system justification motive, i.e., the need to engage in whatever the researchers are measuring and calling 
“system justification”. 
2
 Analyses were conducted controlling for BJW and PWE; and it is the adjusted means which are presented 
here. BJW (r = -.41, p < .02) and PWE (r = -.51, p < .01) were both negatively correlated with support for 
social redistributive programs. Neither BJW nor PWE interacted with the manipulation in predicting 
support for social redistributive policies. 
3
 Analyses were again conducted controlling for BJW and PWE; and it is the adjusted means which are 
presented here. BJW (r = .32, p < .02) and PWE (r = .26, p = .04) were both positively correlated with 
endorsement of the system justifying explanation. Furthermore, neither BJW nor PWE was affected by the 
manipulation, nor did they interact with it in predicting endorsements of the two explanations. 
4
 Participants’ ratings of the two explanations were negatively correlated, r = -.29, p < .03. However, this 
correlation was not so high as to make ratings of the two explanations completely redundant, and so they 
were considered separately in the analyses. 
5
 Participants’ ratings of the two explanations were negatively correlated, though not significantly so, r = -
.19, p = .18. 
6
 Parallel analyses failed to show evidence of a mediated path on women’s endorsements of the unfairness 




Belief in a Just World scale 




 strong strong 
 disagreement agreement 
 
1- I feel that people get what they are entitled to 
have 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2- I feel that a person’s efforts are noticed and 
rewarded 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
3- I feel that people earn the rewards and 
punishments they get 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
4- I feel that people who meet with misfortune 
have brought it on themselves 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
5- I feel that people get what they deserve 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6- I feel that rewards and punishments are fairly 
given 
1 2 3 4 5 6 





Protestant Work Ethic scale 
Please use the scale provided to rate your agreement with the following statements: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly disagree     strongly agree 
1- Getting ahead is a matter of working hard and relying only on yourself _______ 
2- People are responsible for their own situation in life _______ 
3- People should not count on others to solve their problems for them _______ 
4- A person who blames others for his or her problems is a cop-out _______ 
5- If you want to be successful, all you need to do is work hard and improve 
yourself _______ 
6- Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements _______ 
7- Our society would have fewer problems if people had less leisure time _______ 
8- Money acquired easily is usually spent unwisely _______ 
9- Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy _______ 
10- Anyone who is willing and able to work hard has a good chance of 
succeeding _______ 
11- People who fail at a job have usually not tried hard enough _______ 
12- Life would have very little meaning if we never had to suffer _______ 
13- The person who can approach an unpleasant task with enthusiasm is the person who 
gets ahead _______ 
14- If people work hard enough they are likely to make a good life for 
themselves _______ 
15- I feel uneasy when there is little work for me to do _______ 




Positive And Negative Affect Scale 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Read each item, and use the scale provided to indicate to what extent you feel that way 
right now, that is, at the present moment. 
 Very slightly A little Moderately Quite a bit Extremely
 or not at all 
1- Interested 1 2 3 4 5 
2- Distressed 1 2 3 4 5 
3- Excited 1 2 3 4 5 
4- Upset 1 2 3 4 5 
5- Strong 1 2 3 4 5 
6- Guilty 1 2 3 4 5 
7- Scared 1 2 3 4 5 
8- Hostile 1 2 3 4 5 
9- Enthusiastic 1 2 3 4 5 
10- Proud 1 2 3 4 5 
11- Irritable 1 2 3 4 5 
12- Alert 1 2 3 4 5 
13- Ashamed 1 2 3 4 5 
14- Inspired 1 2 3 4 5 
15- Nervous 1 2 3 4 5 
16- Determined 1 2 3 4 5 
17- Attentive 1 2 3 4 5 
18- Jittery 1 2 3 4 5 
19- Active 1 2 3 4 5 





Please circle the number that best corresponds to your agreement with each statement 
below: 
 strongly strongly 
 disagree agree 
 
1- I often think about being Canadian. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2- Being Canadian has little to do with how I 
feel about myself in general. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3- Being Canadian is an important part of my 
self image. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4- The fact that I am Canadian rarely enters my 
mind.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5- In general I’m glad to be Canadian. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6- I often regret being Canadian. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Generally I feel good about myself when I 
think about being Canadian. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8- I don’t feel good about being Canadian. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9- I have a lot in common with other 
Canadians. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
10- I feel strong ties to other Canadians. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
11- I find it difficult to form a bond with other 
Canadians. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. I don’t feel a strong sense of being 
connected to Canadians. 





Positive perceptions of Canadian people 
 
Please use the scale provided to rate your agreement with the following statements. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly disagree     strongly agree 
 
1- In general, Canadians are intelligent people.  _______ 
2- In general, Canadians are athletic people.  _______ 
3- In general, Canadians are competent people.  _______ 




Average salaries of Canadian men and women 
 Women Men Men’s % advantage 
 All Canadians $24,390 $38,347 56% 
Full-time university professors $63,746 $79,993 25% 
Young full-time university professors $40,816 $48,339 17% 
 
All data are in Canadian dollars, from the 2001 Canadian census. 





Unemployment rates and percentage of group members with at least a University degree 
Ethnic group Unemployment University degrees 
White 7.4% 23% 
Chinese 8.4% 46%  * 
South Asian 9.6% 38%  * 
Black 11.5% 18% 
Filipino 5.6% 31% 
Latin American 10.5% 20% 
Southeast Asian 9.8% 20% 
Arab 14.3% 48%  * 
West Asian 13.5% 30%  * 
Korean 8.7% 37%  * 
Japanese 6.1% 28% 
 
Asterisks denote ethnic groups who have higher unemployment rates than White Canadians, despite having 
more university degrees 





Participants’ willingness to support 6 community service programs in various ways (Study 1) 
Condition High inevitability Low inevitability Difference 
 M SD M SD 
Tutoring 
Support creation 6.09 0.87 6.38 0.80 -0.29 
Vote for government funding 5.90 1.11 6.00 0.95 -0.10 
Volunteer 4.32 1.91 5.29 1.45 -0.97 
t
 
 Donate money 4.55 1.79 4.76 1.76 -0.78 
Tutoring overall 5.22 1.05 5.61 1.03 -0.39 
Soup kitchen 
Support creation 6.18 0.85 6.25 0.79 -0.07 
Vote for government funding 5.91 1.23 5.80 1.28 0.09 
Volunteer 4.68 1.81 5.35 1.46 -0.67 
 Donate money 4.59 1.68 4.85 1.53 -0.26 
Soup kitchen overall 5.34 1.07 5.56 1.07 -0.22 
Job training  
Support creation 5.95 0.84 6.00 1.14 -0.05 
Vote for government funding 5.14 1.39 5.19 1.57 -0.05 
Volunteer 3.90 2.04 4.76 1.64 -0.86 
 Donate money 3.68 1.67 3.71 1.49 -0.03 
Job training overall 4.67 1.06 4.92 1.13 -0.25 
Mentorship 
 Support creation 6.09 0.87 6.52 0.75 -0.43 
t
 
Vote for government funding 5.22 1.15 5.47 1.60 -0.25 
Volunteer 4.31 1.93 5.81 1.25 -1.50 ** 
 Donate money 3.45 1.41 4.90 1.58 -1.45 ** 
Mentorship overall 4.77 0.99 5.68 0.94 -0.91 ** 
Crisis hotline  
Support creation 6.00 1.02 6.38 0.26 -0.38 
Vote for government funding 5.18 1.50 5.90 0.34 -0.72 
t
 
Volunteer 3.68 2.23 5.29 0.49 -1.61 * 
 Donate money 3.59 1.84 4.52 0.40 -0.93 
Crisis hotline overall 4.61 1.28 5.52 1.09 -0.91 * 
Adopt-a-grandparent 
Support creation 5.64 1.21 6.43 0.81 -0.79 
*
 
Vote for government funding 4.77 1.69 5.43 1.40 -0.66 
Volunteer 4.14 1.91 5.19 1.78 -1.05 
t
 
 Donate money 3.59 1.56 4.23 1.76 -0.64 
Adopt-a-grandparent overall 4.53 1.06 5.32 1.15 -0.79 * 
 
Support for creation overall 5.99 0.75 6.33 0.63 -0.34 
Vote for government funding overall 5.36 1.02 5.64 0.87 -0.28 
Volunteer overall 4.17 1.66 5.29 1.16 -1.12 * 
Donate money overall 3.91 1.40 4.52 1.35 -0.61 
Overall support for all programs 4.86 0.86 5.45 0.78 -0.59 * 
 
t
: p < .10 
*: p < .05 




Participants’ willingness to support 6 community service programs in various ways, adjusted for BJW and 
PWE scores (Study 2) 
Condition High inevitability Low inevitability Difference 
 M SE M SE 
Tutoring 
Support creation 6.13 0.19 6.55 0.18 -0.42 
Vote for government funding 5.90 0.36 5.76 0.35 0.14 
Volunteer 3.99 0.40 5.51 0.39 -1.52 * 
 Donate money 4.23 0.39 5.01 0.38 -0.78 
Tutoring overall 5.06 0.27 5.71 0.26 -0.65 
Soup kitchen 
Support creation 6.06 0.18 6.61 0.18 -0.65 * 
Vote for government funding 5.82 0.35 5.90 0.34 -0.08 
Volunteer 4.05 0.39 5.73 0.38 -1.68 ** 
 Donate money 4.39 0.34 5.35 0.33 -0.96 
t
 
Soup kitchen overall 5.08 0.24 5.90 0.23 -0.82 * 
Job training  
Support creation 5.81 0.30 6.40 0.29 -0.59 
Vote for government funding 5.31 0.37 5.93 0.36 -0.62 
Volunteer 4.09 0.37 4.92 0.36 -0.83 
 Donate money 3.87 0.38 4.18 0.36 -0.31 
Job training overall 4.77 0.28 5.36 0.27 -0.59 
Mentorship  
Support creation 5.95 0.15 6.83 0.14 -0.88 *** 
Vote for government funding 5.33 0.28 5.97 0.28 -0.64 
Volunteer 4.52 0.33 6.18 0.32 -1.66 ** 
 Donate money 4.14 0.36 5.31 0.35 -1.17 * 
Mentorship overall 5.00 0.21 6.07 0.21 -1.07 ** 
Crisis hotline  
Support creation 5.76 0.27 6.40 0.26 -0.64 
Vote for government funding 5.39 0.35 5.46 0.34 -0.07 
Volunteer 3.59 0.50 4.49 0.49 -0.90 
 Donate money 3.87 0.42 4.40 0.40 -0.53 
Crisis hotline overall 4.66 0.29 5.19 0.28 -0.53 
Adopt-a-grandparent 
Support creation 5.79 0.21 6.31 0.20 -0.52 
t
 
Vote for government funding 5.21 0.33 4.92 0.32 0.29 
Volunteer 4.13 0.42 5.99 0.41 -1.86 
 Donate money 3.79 0.41 4.53 0.39 -0.74 
Adopt-a-grandparent overall 4.73 0.26 5.19 0.25 -0.46 
 
Support for creation overall 5.92 0.16 6.52 0.15 -0.60 * 
Vote for government funding overall 5.49 0.25 5.66 0.25 -0.17 
Volunteer overall 4.06 0.29 5.30 0.28 -1.24 ** 
Donate money overall 5.92 0.16 6.52 0.15 -0.60 * 
Overall support for all programs 5.35 0.16 6.00 0.15 -0.65 ** 
 
t
: p < .10 
*: p < .05 
**: p < .01 





Women’s endorsements of system justifying and system blaming explanations for a 
gender discrepancy, adjusted for BJW and PWE scores (Study 3) 
Gender discrepancy in Germany Canada 
High inevitability in Germany Canada Germany Canada 
 M SE M SE M SE M SE 
System justifying explanation 4.15 0.56 3.13 0.50 4.36 0.58 5.35 0.53 
System blaming explanation 6.08 0.43 6.69 0.38 6.75 0.44 5.50 0.41 
Difference -1.97  -3.56  -2.39  -0.15 




Men’s and women’s endorsements of system justifying and system blaming explanations 
for the gender discrepancy (Study 4) 
 Men Women 
Inevitability  low high low high 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
System justifying explanation 4.25 1.91 3.86 1.88 3.07 2.30 5.23 1.96 
System blaming explanation 4.83 2.62 5.07 2.20 6.43 1.65 5.15 2.03 
Difference -0.58  -1.21  -3.36  0.08 









For ease of presentation, Figure 1 presents overall system justification in each condition, 
as calculated by the subtraction of participants’ endorsement of the system blaming 
explanation from their endorsement of the system justifying explanation. Note, however, 








For ease of presentation, Figure 2 presents overall system justification in each condition, 
as calculated by the subtraction of participants’ endorsement of the system blaming 
explanation from their endorsement of the system justifying explanation. Note, however, 
that the analysis was conducted as a repeated-measures ANOVA, using endorsements of 








High vs. Low 
Inevitability 
Endorsement of a 
system justifying 
explanation 




Sobel = 2.30, p < .03 
